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1. Summary  
There are many definitions of organised crime. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has 
developed a general definition:  
Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from 
illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is 
maintained through corruption of public officials and the use of intimidation, threats or 
force to protect its operations. 
Under the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, ‘serious crime’ refers to offences 
punishable by a penalty of incarceration for at least four years.1 Common examples of serious 
organised crime are modern slavery, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal drugs, illegal 
arms, fraud and other economic crime.  
This review looks at drivers and enablers of serious organised crime (SOC) in Southeast Asia. 
The four main forms of SOC in the region are: a) illicit drugs; b) human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling; c) environmental crimes (e.g. illegal logging, wildlife trade); and d) counterfeit goods. 
While the situation in each country is different, and there are many country-specific factors 
involved in SOC in Southeast Asia, the review identified a number of common issues relevant 
across many countries in the region. For some of these the literature makes a direct correlation 
with SOC (e.g. expansion of the internet), but for others this correlation is not clearly established: 
rather, the literature indicates that countries with high levels of SOC have these features.  
Common factors associated with SOC in Southeast Asia are: 
 Corruption, weak democratic foundations and lack of enforcement: Southeast Asian 
countries (with some exceptions) are characterised by high levels of corruption and weak 
democratic traditions. These create opportunities for SOC groups to flourish. While a 
number of countries have introduced measures to combat organised crime, enforcement 
is often weak. 
 Lack of alternative (licit) sources of livelihood: many Southeast Asian countries have high 
levels of poverty and unemployment/under-employment, with limited opportunities for 
people to earn a living. This, coupled with differences in economic development between 
different countries and demand for cheap labour, is particularly a factor in migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking. 
 Conflict: conflict can often create an enabling environment for serious organised crime. 
Conflict in Myanmar’s Shan State, for example, has facilitated the rapid expansion in 
production of methamphetamines, while decades of conflict in Cambodia enabled the 
systematic looting of the country’s artefacts. Indeed, the benefits to insurgent groups and 
others from organised crime can dis-incentivise efforts to end conflict. 
 Cultural tolerance, indeed demand for, some forms of SOC: notably illegal wildlife 
products – it is local demand for these that drives illicit wildlife exploitation, not just within 
Southeast Asia but also from Africa (e.g. rhino horn) and other places. Wildlife products 
feature in diverse aspects of Southeast Asian life and culture, e.g. medicine, food, 
decorations. There is similar, albeit less, tolerance in many parts of the region for sexual 
                                                   
1 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-1/key-issues/definition-in-convention.html 
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exploitation, including child sexual exploitation: much of the demand for this comes not 
from Westerners, but from Asian sex tourists and locals.  
 New avenues for SOC are being created through the internet: the rise in social media 
and e-commerce has made it easier to source and sell products, e.g. falsified medicines 
and counterfeit goods, and to reach a wider consumer base, within and beyond 
Southeast Asia. The internet has reduced both costs and risks for those engaged in illicit 
trade. 
 Growth and improvements in regional transport infrastructure: in particular with China as 
a result of that country’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. This is paving the way for expansion in 
legitimate commerce and trade in the region, but also for illicit trade. Related to this is the 
proximity of countries within the region, the multiple lengthy borders – often porous - 
between them, and the difficulties involved in monitoring all these.  
 Strong vested interests in SOC: as well as the obvious organised criminal groups, there 
are often other influential entities which also benefit from SOC and therefore work to 
perpetuate it. These can include political groups, the military, business conglomerates 
and non-state armed groups.   
 Chinese influence: China emerges from the literature as a significant factor in driving 
SOC in Southeast Asia. This is as a consumer of illicit products, e.g. drugs, wildlife 
products; as a destination country for human trafficking (especially of women); and 
through its efforts to improve transport infrastructure and communications (which also 
facilitates illicit trade). 
With regard to country-specific information about the causes of SOC, in the time available little 
was found in the literature on the Philippines and Thailand. However, there was far more on 
Myanmar, as well as some information on Cambodia and Viet Nam. 
Myanmar: the literature identifies Myanmar as a particular hub of SOC in Southeast Asia, 
notably illegal drugs, as well as illegal logging, jade and gem mining, and wildlife trade. A key 
factor driving the rise of these forms of SOC in Myanmar has been so-called ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’ whereby the military entered into ceasefire agreements with insurgent groups, in 
return allowing them to carry out illicit activities. Other factors are the country’s location, 
improving transport links, relative poverty and lack of economic development, and corruption.  
Cambodia: serious organised crime in Cambodia includes human trafficking, drugs production 
and trafficking, illegal logging, arms smuggling and theft of historical artefacts. Poverty and lack 
of employment opportunities have been important drivers of cross-border migration and 
trafficking; many women are sold to meet Chinese demand for brides. The drugs trade benefits 
from Cambodia’s central location between Thailand, Viet Nam, Myanmar and China. Arms 
smuggling and artefact theft were a consequence of the country’s decades of conflict.  
Viet Nam: like Cambodia, Viet Nam’s location makes it suitable for drug trafficking. Migrant 
smuggling and trafficking is driven by the country’s relative economic under-development. Again 
China’s demand for women, as well as cultural preference for male children, drives trafficking of 
Vietnamese women as well as babies and young boys from regions bordering China.  
This review drew largely on grey literature, in particular reports by international development 
agencies and non-government organisations working on combatting SOC in the region. With the 
exception of sexual exploitation and human trafficking, the literature was largely gender-blind and 
made no mention of persons with disabilities. 
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The remainder of this report looks, firstly, at the main forms of SOC in Southeast Asia and the 
general factors driving each of these. This is followed by a more in-depth examination of the 
specific drivers of SOC in Myanmar, Cambodia and Viet Nam.  
2. Regional trends and drivers 
A 2019 report on transnational crime in Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2019: 1) identifies four main 
forms (markets): a) drugs and precursor chemicals; b) trafficking in persons and smuggling of 
migrants; c) environmental crimes; and d) counterfeit goods and falsified medicines. This section 
looks at trends in each of these in Southeast Asia and identifies some of the driving factors.  
Drugs and precursor chemicals  
Southeast Asia has long been a hub for narcotics production and trafficking. However, over the 
past decade there have been profound changes in the illicit drugs market in Southeast Asia, with 
steep increases in the manufacture of synthetic drugs, in particular methamphetamine (meth), 
and reduced demand for heroin – seen in reduced heroin imports from Afghanistan and reduced 
local production (UNODC, 2019). A significant contributory factor in this shift has been heavy 
enforcement measures in China to suppress the drugs trade, which has forced production to 
move out of the country, and Chinese and international pressure on countries in the region to 
curb poppy cultivation (UNODC, 2019: 1; ICG, 2019). Much of the manufacture of 
methamphetamine is taking place in northern Myanmar (discussed below). Nonetheless, the 
heroin trade is still significant: today the region is almost exclusively supplied by heroin produced 
in northern Myanmar, and Southeast Asian heroin also dominates the Australian market 
(UNODC, 2019: 2). 
Another change has been the growing importance of the Myanmar-Thailand and Thailand-
Malaysia borders for regional and inter-regional trafficking. Southeast Asia has become more 
important as an origin and transit region for neighbouring countries, including Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand and the Republic of Korea (UNODC, 2019: 2). Enforcement measures along the 
northern Myanmar-Thailand border, starting in 2019, have again shifted trafficking routes with 
more methamphetamine being moved eastward through Lao PDR to Thailand, Cambodia and 
Viet Nam, as well as to southern Myanmar for shipment by sea, and into central and southern 
Thailand.     
Human trafficking and migrant smuggling  
Human trafficking takes place predominantly from less developed countries in the region, 
including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam, to more developed 
countries such as China, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as to destinations outside the region. 
Organised crime groups trafficking people exploit differences in economic development and 
demand for cheap labour (UNODC, 2019).  
Trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation is a major problem in most countries of the 
region (UNODC, 2019: 4). Many are trafficked for sexual exploitation outside the region, 
especially Japan and Korea, as well as some countries in Europe and the Middle East (UNODC, 
2019: 4). Sex markets in the Greater Mekong Sub-region are based on both high levels of sex 
tourism and strong domestic demand: while sex tourism from the West is the best documented, 
Asian sex tourists appear to be more numerous (UNODC, 2013: iv). Both sex tourists and local 
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consumers provide demand for underage victims, and this could be one of the driving forces 
behind trafficking (UNODC, 2013: iv). Almost 70% of those trafficked for sexual exploitation were 
underage girls (UNODC, 2019: 4).  
Another factor in trafficking of women is the demand for brides in China. The country’s one child 
policy, implemented from 1979 to 2015, and the preference for boys, has led to a shortage of 
women: the percentage of the population who are women  has fallen every year since 1987 
(HRW, 2019). The gender gap among the population aged 15-29 years is increasing, and 
projections suggest that by 2030, 25% of Chinese men in their 30s will never have married 
(HRW, 2019). This is creating demand for foreign women, which is being exploited by human 
traffickers. Human Rights Watch (2019) cites the example of Myanmar’s Kachin State, from 
where large numbers of women are being trafficked to become Chinese brides. As well as 
demand from China, a major ‘push’ factor is prolonged conflict in Kachin State and neighbouring 
Shan State which has left many people struggling to survive and with few opportunities to 
support their families: ‘traffickers prey on their desperation’ (HRW, 2019). 
Due to their relative economic prosperity and continual labour shortages, Malaysia and Thailand 
are two of the principal destinations for smuggled migrants within Asia. In the case of Thailand, a 
UNODC report identifies higher wages and the demand for labour in certain industries, combined 
with the lack of income-generating opportunities and widespread poverty in the source countries 
(Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) as the main pull factors drawing migrant workers to Thailand 
(UNODC, 2017). While there are formal migration channels, complying with these can be 
expensive, bureaucratic and time-consuming; many migrants therefore turn to smugglers to 
facilitate their entry and help them find work (UNODC, 2013: iii; UNODC, 2017). Migrant 
smuggling networks in Southeast Asia are facilitated by corruption among government officials 
and private employers, a lack of accountability, and inadequate criminal justice responses 
(UNODC, 2019: 5). The illegal status of migrants can provide opportunities for traffickers to 
recruit and exploit them (UNODC, 2017).  
Environmental crimes  
Southeast Asia is home to some of the world’s largest illicit wildlife markets, due to a combination 
of strong local demand (in numerous countries) and reliable local supply from within the region 
(UNODC, 2019: 5). This demand is also driving trafficking of African ivory and rhino horn, as well 
as African pangolins and their scales (following decimation of Asian pangolin populations). 
Population growth as well as burgeoning affluence have led to rising demand for luxury and 
exotic products, including wildlife products (UNODC, 2013: vii; Tournier, 2015). A report on the 
wildlife trade in Southeast Asia highlights the diverse ways the region is dependent on wildlife 
resources (Traffic, n.d.: 1; see also Tournier, 2015: 5):  
 Traditional medicines use wildlife as ingredients, including tiger bone, bear gall bladder, 
pangolin scales and rhinoceros horn; 
 Much of the pet trade is dominated by reptiles and birds, and there is an increasing trend 
for specialist collectors of some of the world’s rarest species. This global demand for rare 
and exotic pets fuels much of the illegal collection and smuggling within the region, as 
well as from further afield; 
 In many parts of the region, wild meat from species such as deer, pangolin and snakes is 
consumed as delicacies or ‘tonic’ food. Meat from freshwater turtles, for example, is 
prized as turtles are long-lived animals and consumers hope to attain similar longevity; 
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turtle meat is consumed in huge volumes despite three-quarters of species in the region 
being considered threatened; 
 A wide range of animal products are found in Southeast Asia’s ornamental trade, 
including elephant ivory carvings, seashells, coral, horns, antlers and mounted insects 
such as butterflies and beetles. 
While some counter-wildlife trafficking measures have been introduced, their effectiveness is 
undermined by: one, the sophistication of criminal networks and their ability to adapt and evade 
restrictions; and two, by lack of capacity and resources on the part of the agencies involved in 
implementation (Tournier, 2015). The latter (lack of resources) reflects a lack of consideration by 
government regarding the seriousness of the illegal wildlife trade (Tournier, 2015: 12). 
Illicit timber trade is another big problem in Southeast Asia, with organised criminal networks 
operating at all levels of the supply chain from source forests to consumer markets; they may be 
involved in commercial-scale illegal logging, timber processing, paper and pulp manufacturing 
and transporting timber across borders (UNODC, 2019: 6). They are facilitated by weak 
governance of forest resources, unclear forest tenure, corruption in timber supply chains, and the 
region’s proximity to consumer markets and timber processing industries in China (UNODC, 
2019: 6). Again, there is strong demand locally and further afield: agarwood, for example, is a 
highly prized fragrant heartwood used for medicinal, religious and aromatic purposes in Asian 
cultures from the Middle East through to China and Japan (Traffic, n.d.: 3).  
While various government logging bans and other timber sector regulations in the region are 
helping to reduce illegal trafficking of timber from the region, ‘these same efforts, in combination 
with persistently high demand, are driving up prices and displacing the trade to alternative 
species and more vulnerable source countries within and beyond Southeast Asia’ (UNODC, 
2019: 6). For example, trade in rosewood species increased leading to dwindling supplies in 
Southeast Asia.   
Counterfeit goods and falsified medicines  
Counterfeiters in Southeast Asia produce, assemble and repackage a wide range of fake 
consumer goods and industrial products. Counterfeit goods most commonly associated with 
Southeast Asia include luxury consumer products such as apparel, footwear, handbags, 
electronics and perfumes, common goods such as foodstuff and alcohol, and business-to-
business products such as chemicals and industrial parts (UNODC, 2019: 6-7). While a large 
share of these illicit goods are manufactured in China, Southeast Asian countries – in particular 
Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam – are playing a more significant role in manufacture and 
repackaging, and Singapore continues to be a primary transit hub for the trade (UNODC, 2019: 
7). A number of factors have enabled the counterfeit goods trade in the region to develop into a 
multi-billion dollar industry (UNODC, 2019: 6-7):  
 Increasingly accessible manufacturing technologies and the growth in e-commerce and 
advertising on social media – enabling counterfeiters to broaden and diversify the range 
of counterfeit goods and spare parts sold online, and to distribute to customers in small 
parcels via postal and express freight services; 
 Low levels of consumer concern and awareness of associated risks with substandard 
and hazardous goods; 
 Difficulty in detecting falsified goods among vast legitimate commercial flows. 
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Increasing amounts of falsified medicines are being manufactured in Southeast Asia. Again a 
number of factors are involved (UNODC, 2019: 7-8): 
 Legitimate and illegitimate pharmaceutical producers based in India and China have 
transferred or outsourced some manufacturing to Malaysia, Viet Nam, Myanmar and 
Cambodia to avoid tougher regulations and enforcement and to benefit from lower 
production costs; 
 The internet has made medicines more affordable and easier to obtain, while also 
making it more difficult for consumers to know if what they are buying is counterfeit, 
contaminated or otherwise unsafe. Organised criminal groups in Asia are actively 
involved in the illicit online medicine trade, and are also increasingly attempting to traffic 
falsified and counterfeit medicines via online pharmacies into North America; 
 Corruption plays a major role in the trade of falsified medicines, with some trafficking 
networks recruiting current or former pharmaceutical company executives and state 
officials with knowledge of national regulatory and industrial systems. A number of 
healthcare professionals have been arrested in relation to falsified medicines, 
highlighting the role of corruption in the trade. 
Corruption and ‘crisis of democracy’  
As seen, corruption is a factor in many forms of serious organised crime in Southeast Asia. The 
region as a whole, with the exception of Singapore, is characterised by high levels of corruption. 
Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)2 found little progress in 
the fight against corruption in the region. The Philippines and Thailand were both ranked 99 out 
of 180 countries (with a CPI score of 36/100); Viet Nam was ranked 117 (CPI score 33/100); 
Myanmar 132 (29/100); and Cambodia 161 (20/100).3 On Cambodia, for example, Transparency 
International (2016) note: 
Corruption permeates every aspect of the Cambodian social fabric: the elite has 
monopolised procurement, land concessions and access to resources through the 
establishment of patron-client networks. A kleptocratic bureaucracy thrives on red tape, 
while the population is disillusioned with governance institutions. 
Ear (2010: 64) makes the same point: ‘Cambodia remains burdened by endemic corruption and 
an entrenched system of client patronage that leaves many of its population impoverished and 
subject to exploitation by the country’s rich and powerful’.   
Transparency International point to a ‘crisis of democracy’ stifling anti-corruption efforts in 
Southeast Asia. Risks to democratic foundations in the region include: a) weakening of 
democratic institutions which diminishes any sustained effort to fight corruption; b) the general 
decline of political rights; and c) a lack of progress in enforcement of anti-corruption legislation 
and mechanisms.    





Enabling environment for meth production  
Shan State in Myanmar borders China, Laos and Thailand; along with western Laos and 
northern Thailand, it formed the ‘Golden Triangle’ - a long established hub of opium cultivation 
and drug processing (ICG, 2019: 3). However, from the late 1990s heroin production declined, 
and production of methamphetamines (meth) began. By 2010 there had been a sharp shift in 
Shan State from heroin to meth: Myanmar remains the second largest global producer of heroin, 
albeit now far behind Afghanistan, but it has become one of the largest global centres for 
production of crystal methamphetamine or ‘ice’ (ICG, 2019: 5). Produced mostly for export, key 
markets are Japan and Australia, as well as China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, South 
Korea and New Zealand (ICG, 2019: 10). Moreover, ‘the trade is becoming highly 
professionalised, dominated by transnational criminal syndicates operating at huge scale’ (ICG, 
2019: 11).  
Crystal meth is a high-purity pharmaceutical-type product and its synthesis requires trained 
chemists, sophisticated laboratory equipment, and a supply of massive quantities of specific 
precursor chemicals, several of which are highly controlled substances (ICG, 2019: 7). All of 
these must be brought into Myanmar. Many of the chemists reportedly come from Taiwan, while 
precursor chemicals can be brought in from China, where they are readily available through 
legitimate pharmaceutical and chemical markets and from illicit precursor-producing factories 
(ICG, 2019: 9).  
In addition, crystal meth production requires what the International Crisis Group (ICG) describes 
as ‘a kind of predictable insecurity’ (ICG, 2019: 8): 
Industrial-scale clandestine laboratories need to remain hidden and inaccessible to law 
enforcement or others who may scrutinise them; areas controlled by compliant non-state 
armed groups are ideal. At the same time, those areas, cannot be too unstable, as this 
would put the investment at risk. Like any manufacturing business, drug production 
requires good transport infrastructure for the delivery of large quantities of raw materials 
and onward movement of the finished product. Crossing the front lines of an active 
conflict is not an appealing prospect in this regard. 
Parts of Shan State perfectly meet these requirements. From the early 1990s the Myanmar junta 
operated a laissez faire policy of allowing insurgent groups in semi-autonomous regions to carry 
out illicit trade (in drugs, timber, jade, wildlife) to enable conflict to subside (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 
2; Bak, 2019). This has been described as ‘ceasefire capitalism’ (Bak, 2019: 5-6):  
the state of Myanmar has used ceasefire agreements to convert former zones of 
insurgencies into sources of wealth for armed groups and political allies…..ceasefire 
capitalism has allowed the military-state to enter disputed areas, co-opt non-state actors 
that are signatories to ceasefire agreements into its networks, and increase its influence 
over capital flows in disputed territories. 
Shan State is one of the areas where this policy was applied. There are areas under the control 
of militia forces allied with the Myanmar army: in return for keeping out anti-government armed 
groups and fighting alongside the military in particular operations, the military turns a blind eye to 
their involvement in illicit activities. Similarly Border Guard Forces, partially within the Tatmadaw 
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(Myanmar army) chain of command, in practice operate independently much like militias, and 
have wide latitude to pursue licit and illicit business activities (ICG, 2019: 9). Enclaves within 
Shan State are under the full territorial control of armed groups and the Myanmar civilian and 
military authorities cannot freely enter.  
As well as providing a stable and secure environment for meth production, these diverse safe 
havens are also well-located from a transport and logistics perspective – either adjacent to the 
Chinese border or near major trade routes (ICG, 2019: 9). Indeed, northern Shan State sits 
astride Myanmar’s primary overland trade route, the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse road, connecting the 
country to its largest trade partner, China (ICG, 2019: 17). Since 1989 Shan State’s economy 
has become closely bound with that of south-west China. Chinese investment has surged, huge 
plantations have been set up to serve the Chinese market, and cross-border trade has 
‘skyrocketed’ (ICG, 2019: 18). The improvement in transport infrastructure to accommodate the 
increased flows, has also facilitated illicit trade including drugs. Felbab-Brown (2017: 3) notes 
that transnational organised crime actors from China, India, Thailand and other places are deeply 
and intimately involved in Myanmar’s illegal drug, logging, mining and wildlife economy. 
The drug trade is now so extensive and profitable that it ‘dwarfs the formal economy of Shan 
State, lies at the heart of its political economy, fuels criminality and corruption and hinders efforts 
to end the state’s long-running ethnic conflicts’ (ICG, 2019: i). Militias and other armed actors that 
control areas of production and trafficking routes, and gain revenue from the trade, have a 
disincentive to demobilise. This is because weapons, territorial control and the absence of state 
institutions are essential to keep the trade going and maintain those revenues. It is important to 
stress that the military – through military-linked economic conglomerates (e.g. Myanmar 
Economic Holdings Limited or MEHL) and cronies – benefit hugely from illicit economic activities 
in the country, and thus also have little incentive to curb such trade (Felbab-Brown, 2017; ICG, 
2019).  
Since the late 2000s, and particularly the handover of power to civilian elected government, there 
have been some changes in the long-established arrangement in areas where ceasefires were 
underpinned by insurgent groups being given stakes in resource exploitation and illegal 
economies. The outgoing military regime and associated businessmen, powerbrokers and 
conglomerates tried to restructure things so that their economic profits increased (Felbab-Brown, 
2017: 2). This has led to the ceasefires starting to break down and escalation in violent conflict 
(Felbab-Brown, 2017; ICG, 2019). ‘Currently the ethnic conflict in the northern parts of Myanmar 
is at its greatest intensity since the 1990s ceasefires’ (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 5). However, illicit 
trade – including in drugs, logging, mining and wildlife trafficking – continues to thrive (Felbab-
Brown, 2017). 
Illegal logging, jade and gem mining  
As well as the drugs trade, Myanmar’s illicit economy features illegal logging, jade and gem 
mining, and wildlife trafficking. One factor contributing to the latter (as well as to the rise in meth 
production) has been, ironically, efforts to clamp down on opium cultivation and heroin production 
in northern Myanmar. Under pressure from the United States and China – which has growing 
addiction rates – the Myanmar junta undertook large-scale eradication of poppy in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, and forced insurgent groups to do the same in areas under their control 
(Felbab-Brown, 2017: 9). The eradication drives caused huge hardships to local populations. ‘As 
coping mechanisms, former opium farmers turned to unrestrained logging, forest foraging and 
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illicit trade in wildlife for subsistence and profit’ (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 9). Insurgent groups and 
the military also became involved in jade and gem trading, and timber.  
‘Valued at billions of dollars…the jade industry in particular came to be one of the most 
significant resource economies, perhaps even surpassing the value of the drug economy’ 
(Felbab-Brown, 2017: 10). Official jade production in Myanmar has plummeted while the illegal 
trade has thrived: in 2011, 21,000 tons of the estimated 43,000 tons of raw jade disappeared into 
the black market (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 13). For the military, control of the jade economy became 
a key enrichment and strategic priority, and they renegotiated ceasefire deals and engaged in 
land grabs in order to ensure access to extraction economies (Felbab-Brown, 2017). ‘Myanmar’s 
jade licensing system is wide open to corruption and cronyism. The main concessions are in 
government-controlled areas of Hpakant Township, Kachin State, and blocks are awarded 
through a centrally-controlled process which….. favours companies connected to powerful 
figures and high-ranking officials’ (Global Witness, 2015: 10). Today the profits from the illegal 
jade economy are predominantly captured by Tatmadaw commanders, former junta members, 
military business conglomerates, Chinese traders and insurgent group leaders (Global Witness, 
2015; Felbab-Brown, 2017: 13). 
A large proportion of Myanmar’s timber exports to China in recent years consisted of illegal 
overland flows from contested border regions of Myanmar which are not under government 
control (UNODC, 2019: 6). Teak is the species most associated with Myanmar, but considerable 
volumes of rosewood and other species have also been illicitly trafficked from the country to 
China, Thailand and Viet Nam. In 2006, under intense international criticism from environmental 
groups for the razing of forests in Myanmar, China and Myanmar struck a timber trade deal 
restricting the export of unprocessed logs from the latter (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 13). This was 
followed in 2014 by the Myanmar government imposing an additional timber export ban. 
Nonetheless, illegal logging and massive environmental degradation persisted with participation 
by insurgents, the military, businessmen and Chinese companies – all with interests in violating 
formal policies (Felbab-Brown, 2017).  
Since 2006 an unregulated trade in charcoal, often produced from illegal timber, has boomed. 
‘Supplying China’s silicone smelting industry, charcoal now represents a third of Myanmar’s 
timber exports, though charcoal production was almost non-existent in Myanmar before 2007’ 
(Felbab-Brown, 2017: 13). 
Reform challenges  
Elected in 2015, the Aung Sang Suu Kyi government’s scope for reform and action against such 
illicit trade is very limited. One concern is that clamping down on illicit economies would produce 
negative effects on GDP growth, poverty alleviation and income redistribution (Felbab-Brown, 
2017: 3). The risks are significant (Felbab-Brown, 2017: 4): 
If going after organised crime and actors involved in illicit economies only weakens the 
new democratically-elected government, either because targeted rivals mobilise and 
subvert it or because overall economic growth of the country significantly slows down, 
both the anti-crime project and the larger political democratisation project will be 
unsustainable. 
Another issue is the government’s lack of enforcement capacity vis-à-vis a wide range of actors, 
from insurgent groups to military companies and powerful businesses (Felbab-Brown, 2017). 
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Thus, even though new regulations to combat corruption, organised crime and illicit trade are 
promulgated in Naypiydaw, they are not enforced on the ground, particularly in insecure and 
contested areas (Felbab-Brown, 2017). The example above of bans on timber exports from 
Myanmar illustrates the challenges faced in enforcement of measures to combat illicit trade.  
4. Cambodia 
Illegal drugs and arms smuggling 
Cambodia is part of a geographical region that has long been recognised as one of the world’s 
major locations for drug production (Ear, 2010). Clandestine laboratories backed by organised 
crime syndicates manufacture illicit drugs in Cambodia’s sparsely populated areas or new urban 
settings for trafficking to other countries. Ear (2010: 64-65) identifies a number of factors that 
make Cambodia ‘ideal’ as both an origin and transit point for drug trafficking: its centralised 
location between Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam; an under-developed law enforcement 
structure hindered by corrupt practices; and porous borders spanning unpopulated areas of 
jungle that are often poorly monitored and controlled. She warns that, without properly trained 
and equipped law enforcement units, modernisation in the form of more highways crossing 
national boundaries, will lead to higher volumes of commercial traffic – including illegal 
substances – passing through border checkpoints. She also notes that the flow of drugs in and 
out of Cambodia, combined with a large and idle young population susceptible to drug use, is 
resulting in a trend of increased drug abuse and crime in Cambodia (Ear, 2010). 
Cambodia has also been a source and key transit location for small arms smuggling. Following 
the end of over three decades of conflict in Cambodia, the country was left with large surpluses 
of arms and weapons, which were sold in the global illegal arms market. During the 1980s and 
1990s small arms sales from Cambodia became one of the country’s most lucrative activities 
(Ear, 2010: 65). These included assault rifles, general-purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled 
grenades, anti-tank weapons, pistols and ammunition (Ear, 2010: 65). While efforts by 
international partners and organisations have brought nearly half of Cambodia’s supply of 
surplus weapons under government control, the country’s central location means it remains a key 
transit locations for many covert routes of arms movements from China and the Middle East into 
the region (Ear, 2010). 
Illegal logging 
Transparency International (Rahman, 2016: 6) note that Cambodia, like many other countries, 
falls prey to the “natural resource curse”. Valuable assets, such as the country’s forests, are 
being stripped, causing extensive damage to the environment. Factors facilitating land grabbing 
and illegal logging and mining are abuse of public office involving bribery of public officials, 
corruption in the procurement process and lax law enforcement (Rahman, 2016). A 2007 Global 
Witness report (cited in Rahman, 2016) found that relatives of then Prime Minister Hun Sen and 
other senior officials led the country’s most powerful logging syndicate.  
Where environmental regulations exist, they are typically not enforced in a just manner (Rahman, 
2016). Kleptocratic business elites are reportedly able to subvert the law to their advantage due 
to their political connections (Rahman, 2016). Despite widespread abuses by the Hun logging 
syndicate (including land grabbing on a scale that amounted to ‘crimes against humanity’), 
Global Witness could not find a single case of a member of the Hun family being prosecuted or 
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held to account (Rahman, 2016). Another example is the rise of “rubber barons” who profit from 
privileged access in the hunt for land concessions in the logging trade (Rahman, 2016: 7). ‘The 
tragic effects of corruption in natural resource management is exhibited by the fact that 
Cambodia experienced one of the highest national rates of forest loss from 2000 to 2012’ (BBC 
News, 2013, cited in Rahman, 2016: 7). 
Human trafficking and migrant smuggling  
Cambodia is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. According to the 
United Nations Inter-Agency Project (UNIAP), Cambodian men, women and children are 
trafficked for sexual and labour exploitation in Thailand, Malaysia, Macau, and Taiwan; men are 
trafficked for forced labour in the agriculture, fishing, and construction industries, while women 
are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour in factories or as domestic servants (cited 
in Ear, 2010: 66). While trafficking is organised and managed by criminal syndicates, the 
traffickers are often family and friends (Ear, 2010). The literature points to a number of factors 
driving emigration and human trafficking (Ear, 2010; UNODC, 2017: 11-13): 
 The country’s generally poor economic situation relative to the rapid economic growth in 
some neighbouring countries and other Southeast Asian nations.  
 Widespread poverty, landlessness and debt of many rural people. 
 A lack of employment opportunities for the country’s rapidly growing population, 
especially the young. Although official unemployment rates in urban and rural areas of 
Cambodia are traditionally quite low many people do not have full-time work. Even if they 
do, wages are often too low to support workers and their families. Unemployment is also 
considerably higher among young people aged 15 to 24 who, in 2012, comprised 63% of 
Cambodia’s total labour force. Population growth adds further pressure to Cambodia’s 
already tight job market. 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s, Cambodia lost much of the 
economic support it had received from former allies. The political uncertainties and 
reforms that followed led to uneven economic development. The economic growth that 
Cambodia has experienced in recent years has failed to benefit large parts of the 
population, especially those with limited education, training and skills as well as those 
living in rural areas. Recent economic changes have also caused greater socio-economic 
disparities and job competition. 
Cross-border migration, often carried out illegally, makes people vulnerable to trafficking. 
Stolen artefacts  
Cambodia’s decades of conflict enabled the looting of thousands of historic artefacts, taken from 
hundreds of temples and other sites, and smuggled out of the country to be sold to museums 
and private collections around the world. For many years the assumption was that most of the 
looting was a low-level affair, with local people plundering ancient sites and selling statues, 
carvings and stone reliefs in a haphazard fashion (Carmichael, 2014). However, a recent study 
by the University of Glasgow highlights the organised and systematic nature of these thefts. In 
the words of one member of the study team (cited in Carmichael, 2014):   
The organized looting and trafficking of Cambodian antiquities was tied very closely to 
the Cambodian civil war and to organized crime in the country. It began with the war, but 
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it long outlived it, and was actually a very complicated operation, a very organized 
operation, that brought antiquities directly from looted sites here in the country to the very 
top collectors, museums and auction houses in the world. 
The study noted that, as well as organised crime groups, the Cambodian and Thai militaries were 
often involved in looting; at the end of the chain in Thailand was a Bangkok-based dealer who 
provided the laundering link between the criminals and the collectors and museums (Carmichael, 
2014). 
5. Viet Nam 
Drug trafficking 
Like Cambodia, Viet Nam is a key drug trafficking transit point. This is driven by similar factors: 
the country’s proximity to the ‘Golden Triangle’ and centres of drug production (Myanmar, Laos, 
etc.); long and porous land borders with Laos (a large supply market) and China (a large 
consumer market); and ethnic Vietnamese connections with advanced industrial countries (also a 
very large consumer market) (Vuving, 2010: 174). Other factors typical to many countries in the 
region are corruption and lack of political will, as well as lack of effective interagency 
collaboration to combat trafficking. Also as with Cambodia, Viet Nam itself has become a 
destination for drug traffickers, with widespread drug abuse in both urban areas and the 
countryside, affecting all strata of society (Vuving, 2010). 
Human trafficking  
Human trafficking is a significant problem in Viet Nam. Young women in poor families with poor 
education are especially vulnerable to traffickers, who pretend to broker jobs for them in larger 
cities or abroad: many are then sold and forced to become sex workers, mostly in China, 
Cambodia and larger cities of Viet Nam, but also in Macau, Thailand and Malaysia (Vuving, 
2010). China’s shortage of women, and the difficulties faced by men (especially in rural areas) in 
finding wives, has led to tens of thousands of Vietnamese women being sold as brides to 
Chinese men (Vuving, 2010). Another fallout of China’s one child policy and cultural preference 
for male children, is that it has become a big market for the trafficking of young boys and babies 
from neighbouring Viet Nam (Vuving, 2010: 175):  
In the areas bordering China, this has created a serious security threat to young boys, 
male babies, and their families. The media have reported cases in which traffickers 
murdered an entire family in order to take the newborn and young boys across the 
border, where they would be sold at a high price. 
Typically, traffickers are local people who know the victims very well. The illicit trade of women in 
Viet Nam is usually organised in pyramid schemes: many victims become conduits in the 
network and, trying to make profit from their local knowledge, return to their home villages and 
lure their own recruits (Vuving, 2010). The participation of some former victims makes it even 
harder for the authorities to curb human trafficking.  
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